

A Politics of the Stars: Event Thinking in Ontology & Cosmology

Critical of Deleuze's conception of the event, Badiou claims that in order 'to break with dogmatism, the event must be released from every tie to the One. It must be subtracted from Life in order to be released to the stars' (ED 42). In this paper I will examine the different conceptions of the event as presented by Badiou, Deleuze and Whitehead. In particular, I will focus on the relationship between event thinking and a cosmology and ontology of the One. Throughout I shall be arguing for a 'politics of organism' in which the event, contrary to Badiou, highlights the link between the microcosmic and the macrocosmic and our deep connection with the cosmos. Through examining the work of contemporary scientists Lovelock, Harding and Smolin I hope to show how the event thinking as posed by Whitehead and Deleuze is consistent with the findings of contemporary science and that an ontology based on this kind of cosmological event thinking is essential for a responsible political outlook in which we consider ourselves as 'One' with nature rather than as opposed and in a position to exploit.

Badiou: Being and Event

Out of these three thinkers it is clear that Badiou is the odd one out. Badiou's conception of the event and his position on ontology and politics is markedly different from that of Whitehead and Deleuze's and he is a staunch critic of Deleuze. For Badiou, the event is our separation from the One and the birth of the radically new. Our connection to the 'One' is that of a mere unconscious animal lacking free will.

Only through the event can we escape our animality and automaton nature. It is only through the event that subjectivity and free will can be born.

The event creates the new and destroys the possibility of looking back. Being faithful to the event means never being tempted to look back - even if it was possible - now that we have been lucky enough to have encountered the event, we must not reject it. For Badiou, being unfaithful to the event is the definition of evil. The natural state of human beings is a Spinozian perseverance with little more subjectivity than an elementary particle. It is through spontaneous interactions that we *may* be lucky enough to encounter the 'event' which will call on us and transform our being - it will call on us to be faithful to the event, break from the One and embrace the new - to use an example of which Badiou may not approve - it is rather like spontaneous symmetry breaking in elementary physics. Our position to the One is spontaneously broken, leading to a new asymmetry.

An event is something that happens to a subject. Anyone who is willing to devote his or her life to philosophy must know what it is like to be affected by the event. The event is the chance encounter with an influential lecturer, the chance reading of a particular text; it is what suddenly makes you realise that you will never be able to think the same thoughts again, it is the absolute break from everything that was ever before and the emergence of a new world. This is the moment where we have become a subject: 'at a given moment, everything he is - his body, his abilities - is called upon to enable the passing of a truth along its path. This is when the human animal is convoked to be the immortal that he was not yet.' (EE 40)

Badiou refers to the general sort of knowledge that everyone knows about a situation or art, politics, sex, culture etc... as the 'encyclopaedia'. Events lead to new 'truths' for which the encyclopaedia has no words. Events bring something from nothing. While Deleuze believes that event is the becoming of becomings, Badiou claims that we must overturn Deleuzianism. The event is the pure break from becomings.

However, what are the political implications of an ontology which sees us as a multiple without One? Are not the problems of ecological crisis not facing us exactly *because* we adopt such an ontology? History, for Badiou, is 'anti-nature' and the 'omnipresence of singularity' (BE 194). However, do we still want to face this kind of separation from our universe? Is this really any different from the Newtonian conception of the world of which we must outgrow? There is a certain element of Badiou's ethical argument with which I agree thoroughly. When approached by the 'event' we must not refuse it - we must remain faithful to it. Imagine how much 'easier' it would have been to have turned our backs on the event which lead us towards our research, but it would have left us lesser people. Being faithful to that event helped us become who we are. However, why must this event mean that we are ejected from the 'One'? I will return to these questions after examining Deleuze and Whitehead's conceptions of the event.

Deleuze, *The Event and The One*

I will use Badiou's words to summarise Deleuze's event: 'The event is the ontological realisation of the eternal truth of the One, the infinite power of life... the

event is the becoming of becomings, it is a synthesis of past and future... the eternal dimension of the future as a dimension of the past (ED 38). The chaos which pervades Badiou's work does not exist for Deleuze - at least pure chaos (which would imply a pure 'many') does not exist. Deleuze's events are produced in a chaos 'but only on the condition that a sort of screen intervenes' (TF 86). The event is the realisation of the virtual and nothing other than the event subsists.

The event is the creation and continuation of the universe, the creation of problems, the unfolding series of problems as 'Idea' which look not for solvability. The event is the problematic. The problem Idea is the dream of the Gods which give rise to real events. The virtual and actual exist in a reciprocal dance and thus the problem is never solved by anything less than the next problem. 'There are critical points of the event just as there are critical points of temperature' (DR 189). The constant dance of events occurring in the ideal leads to the events in the actual. It is only due to the quantum dance of events that we can experience the macrocosmic. This is what Deleuze means when he claims that 'matter, therefore, is the identity of spirit' (286) – our reality is merely our position in the cosmic dance of the event.

For Deleuze, we do not have to wait until some chance encounter to engender novelty. The only thing that repeats is difference and thus 'ontology is the dice throw, the chaosmos from which the cosmos emerges... If the imperatives of Being have a relation with the I, it is with the fractured I in which, every time, they displace and reconstitute the fracture according to the order of time' (199). Apollo's clear thinking is needed to think the 'Ideas' of Dionysus, yet the two never meet. The event is the very creation of the microcosmic united with the macrocosmic. It is the singular in the

collective and the individual in the universal. Which wound, Deleuze asks ‘is not inflicted by war and derived from society as a whole? Which private event does not have all its coordinates, that is, all its impersonal social singularities?’ (LS 173)

While Badiou can see no event in the philosophy of Leibniz, as Leibniz’s plurality is a deeply connected singular system, Deleuze couldn’t disagree more. Deleuze believes that Leibniz is the modern philosopher of the event. Leibniz realised that nature is always involved in the motion of the event; presenting a philosophy that moves us away from mechanism and towards modulation. The matter of our world is not stable, but full of personality, in other words, it is the event and life is everywhere in the folding and unfolding of the universe. Every monadic compossible and impossible is an event. For Leibniz every move from potentiality to actuality depends on maximum compossibility, every event brings us ‘the best of all possible worlds’ by which Leibniz only means that ‘there is obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest order possible’ (TM 58).

Deleuze dedicates a whole chapter in his book on Leibniz to the ‘event’; however, it is not really Leibniz who he is focusing on, it is Whitehead. Whitehead is Deleuze’s biggest influence when it comes to the event, despite the fact that in the ‘Logic of Sense’ (Deleuze’s book on the event) Whitehead is an unsung hero. Deleuze dedicates some of his best writing to answer the question ‘what is an event?’ and defines it rather beautifully: ‘The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration’ (TF 87). There is something rather incredible about Deleuze’s descriptions of the

event described as the musical resonance of the universe. The universe is akin to the resonances and oscillations of a giant synthesiser. Except that the oscillations and resonances create the synthesiser itself.

‘A concert is being performed tonight. It is the event. Vibrations of sound disperse, periodic movements go through space with their harmonics or submultiples. The sounds have inner qualities of height, intensity, and timbre. The sources of the sounds, instrumental or vocal, are not content only to send the sounds out: each one perceives its own, and perceives the others while perceiving its own. These are active perceptions that are expressed among each other, or else prehensions that are prehending one another: ‘First the solitary piano grieved, like a bird abandoned by its mate; the violin heard its wail and responded to it like a neighbouring tree. It was like the beginning of the world....’ (91).

Badiou hammers Deleuze because he can see that Deleuze’s system provides a vision of the One not dissimilar from that of the absolute Idealists and really not as different as Deleuze may wish from the Absolute of Hegel, Deleuze’s philosophical nemesis. McTaggart’s summary of Hegel’s absolute Idea, ‘Reality is a differentiated unity, in which the unity has no meaning but the differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the unity’, (SHC 19) could almost be a line from Deleuze’s *‘Difference and Repetition’*. However, does such an ontology *necessarily* lead to dogmatism? It is through the event that we can avoid the dogmatic Hegelian endings of such a system. The event creates novelty but it also creates unity: The promise that revolution need not be solitary. The question is can a philosophy which is univocal ever ‘Free political action from all unitary and totalizing power’ (AO xiii)

as promised by Foucault in the preface to Deleuze and Guattari's *'Anti-Oedipus'*? Can event thinking present an ontology which at once avoids the solitary nature of Nietzsche's 'superman', as Deleuze calls for collective passions, 'anti-Oedipus is not alone' (Seem, xxiii), without falling into totalitarianism? It is clear that such an accusation could be thrown at theories of the absolute which see the world as moving towards a 'solution'. Such an ontology could easily fall into 'gardening state' politics. However, for Deleuze there is no final solution. The problematic in Deleuze is never solved by anything other than a new problem. Far from being an ontology of 'monotony' which Badiou scathingly labels it, it is an ontology of creation and relation.

It is well known that Deleuze's philosophy is heavily influenced by Nietzsche and therefore the self-overcoming that occurs in Badiou's philosophy must also find its place in Deleuze's philosophy as well under the concept 'caesura'. At a caesura beginning and end no longer coincide. The caesura constitutes the fractured I, thinking time out of joint 'to make the sun explode, to throw oneself into the volcano, to kill God or the father... they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself' (DR 89-90). It is the direction in which the caesura throws us which creates the difference between Badiou and Deleuze's philosophy. Deleuze's fractured I, or Body Without Organs, embraces the virtual and finds 'a common descendent in the man with no name, without family, without qualities, without self, or I, the 'plebian' guardian of a secret, the already Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime image' (90). It is through this

embrace that we are born new. The event means that the virtual is a constant groundlessness which means that only difference returns. Rather than the One being simply the 'encyclopaedia', it is the infinite genesis of all that could ever be.

Process, Reality, Cosmology and the Event in Whitehead

Whitehead is the philosopher of the event *par excellence*. In Whitehead's *The Concept of Nature* he claims that the event is the ultimate constituent of nature and, therefore, the event is 'all there is'. 'The organic starting point is from the analysis of process as the realization of events disposed in an interlocked community' (SMW 189). Whitehead highlights how the event explains the drama of the cosmological. He tells us that we are accustomed to thinking that an event is something that happens to a subject. A man being hit by a car would be an event. What we are not accustomed to thinking is that the endurance of everyday objects is itself an event. Not only is the building of the great pyramids an event; its endurance from day to day is an event too. 'The whole dance of molecules and the shifting play of the electromagnetic field are ingredients of the event' (CN 78). While the recognizable object, which is the great pyramid, is the same today as it was yesterday, the events that constitute it are not the same. For Whitehead, like Deleuze after him, the event is the becoming of becoming and every event is connected to other events which are constituent of the next transitory event. Nature consists of the process of events.

It is in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead's essay on cosmology, that we are presented with a clear system uniting event thinking with a unified cosmology. Overhauling the traditional notion of experience, Whitehead takes experience as a

metaphysical category 'all the way down'. Events are the way that the universe experiences its own existence. Borrowing the distinction of 'perception' and 'apperception' from Leibniz. Whitehead's events prehend, rather than apprehend, each other and the universe is one of activity and process. Each actual occasion perishes as soon as it emerges. It is engaged in an immediate, vector-style self-realisation which connects to the entire universe. An actual occasion simply acts as a flash of existence which immediately connects to the next actual occasion. The end product of one actual entity is the beginning of another. The world is created from this vector-style procession of flashes of existence. It is by this creative advance of processual preheating that the universe creates itself and everything in it. 'The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses the same river twice' is extended. No thinker thinks twice; and to put the matter more generally, no subject experiences twice.' (PR 29). When actual occasions form a 'nexus' which is interrelated in a determinate fashion, creating something like a molecule for example, it can be defined as an event. 'a molecule is a historic route of actual occasions; and such a route is an event' (PR 80).

One of the most important factors of Whitehead's work is that it returns 'value' to matter. We live in a world in the 'instrumental' and 'value' have been torn apart and as we have torn ourselves from the world we treat it as something we can exploit, a process the Frankfurt school theorists Adorno and Horkheimer referred to as 'perverted mimesis'. Whitehead's cosmology saves us from this perverted mimesis and provides us with an ontology which can help us throw off Max Weber's iron cloak. Fromm claimed that 'Reason flows from the blending of rational thought and feeling. If the two functions are torn apart, thinking deteriorates into schizoid

intellectual activity and feeling deteriorates into neurotic life-damaging passions' (qtd. in Harding 12). In Whitehead's cosmology there is no separation between the instrumental and value, there is no separation between the mental and the physical. They are but two poles in a single actual occasion and will always be united in the event. Through Whitehead's philosophy we can begin to think an ecological critical theory.

Event thinking in Whitehead's work, and in Deleuze's, emphasises the incredible way that the universe perseveres. The universe is ALL there is and Whitehead borrows Spinoza's phrase *Causa Sui* to emphasise that they are the cause of themselves. The universe has a hunger for its own existence: a Leibnizian 'Appetition'. 'It is the enjoyment of emotion which was then, which is now, and which will be then. This vector character is the essence of such entertainment' (MT 165). 'The proper test is not that of finality, but of progress' (PR 14).

For Badiou, being as 'One' is not and therefore nothing 'is' and there is a sense in this premise that he is at once so close to Deleuze and Whitehead and at the same time so far. In fact Badiou is echoing the same passages from Plato's *Timaeus* as Whitehead, all three philosophers adopt a cosmology which is 'always becoming but never is' (Plato 28). Yet while Badiou's ontology is one of detachment, Whitehead's philosophy of organism 'abolishes the detached mind. Mental activity is one of the modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree, but only amounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities' (PR 59). No entity can play a disjointed role in this organic cosmology and the final outcome of every actual

entity or event is the concrescence into unity. 'Completion is the perishing of immediacy: 'it never really is'' (85).

James Lovelock, *Self-Organisation and Gaia*

James Lovelock stands out in science as one of the very few truly 'independent' scientists. Resisting specialisation and being privileged enough to having been able to observe the earth from space, Lovelock has had the ability to escape misplaced concreteness and observe the earth as organism. In the simplest terms his famous Gaia theory is 'a view of the Earth that sees it as a self-regulating system made up from the totality of organisms, the surface rocks, the ocean and the atmosphere tightly coupled as an evolving system' (RG 208). The central idea is that we must view our planet as a 'living Earth'. While previously we have considered Darwin's evolution of organisms and the geological evolution of the material world as two separate processes, Gaia theory unites them into a single Earth history. 'It is time we enlarged the somewhat dogmatic and limited definition of life as something that reproduces and corrects the errors of reproduction by natural selection among the progeny' (20). In our living Earth the whole becomes more than the sum of its parts, the collection of processes work together to form a new emergent self-regulation. 'It is the Gaian system as a whole that does the regulating... the sum of all the complex feedbacks between life, atmosphere, rocks and water give rise to Gaia, the evolving, self-regulating planetary entity that has maintained habitable conditions on the surface of our planet over vast stretches of geological time.' (Harding, AE 64) The Earth keeps itself regulated through feedback loops or circles of participation. Harding animates these as the 'incessant dance of existence' (71). It is through these feedback

loops that Gaia keeps its delicate balance; although, it is a very delicate balance and slight pushes can tip the whole thing off balance with catastrophic consequences.

Lovelock also shows an awareness of the importance of an aesthetic as well as scientific understanding. Originally Lovelock intended to call his theory the Biocybernetic Universal System Tendency or BUST hypothesis, a name which would have probably have gone down much better with the scientific community, however, he was convinced otherwise by Nobel Laureate in literature William Golding who suggested that he use the name 'Gaia' instead. By choosing the name 'Gaia' instead of the rather colder B.U.S.T. we get a feeling for the life of the whole system. This aestheticisation of science suggests how far we must move away from the cold-objectifying Newtonian world-view. 'Metaphor is important because to deal with, understand, and even ameliorate the fix we are in over global change requires us to know the true nature of the Earth and imagine it as the largest living thing in the solar system, not something inanimate like that disreputable contraption 'spaceship Earth' (Lovelock 21). We can no longer see ourselves as separate or superior from the world that we live as a part of. We are utterly dependent on the organism as a whole. 'Gaia gives us all, whether atheist or believer, something much vaster than ourselves to be accountable to.' (Harding 58)

Stephen Harding, a student of Lovelock, highlights the urgency of a rethinking of our attitude towards the world that we live in. In his book *Animate Earth* he calls for us to respect the way that nature is alive and 'full of soul' (21). The worldview of Descartes and Newton lives on in a negative way. While Descartes taught his students that the screams of animals were no more than the creaking of a machine, Harding

argues that we must no longer approach science in such a cold and objectifying way. The Earth is ‘a strange creature that improvises its own unfolding in the cosmos through the ongoing creativity of evolution and self-transformation.’ (38). Therefore, we must rethink the way that we approach our attitude towards science and our planet and this necessarily entails a change in our ontology and our use of language.

Lovelock claims that there has been far too much talk of human rights and not enough talk of Gaia’s rights. It is time to move away from the perspective that sees individual human freedom as the most important political issue. It is time to focus centrally on the survival of our planet; without Gaia we are nothing. Here we see a connection between an eco-politics and the ontology of Whitehead and the world-view presented by Lovelock. It is time to take a more holistic political view where we revert the perverted mimesis that is prevalent in the present political consciousness. Mother Theresa famously told us that we must look after the human race and God will take care of the planet. Unfortunately, while Gaia has supported us through most of our abuse, she cannot take much more. If we do not start take care of her soon much, if not all, of our planet will soon become inhabitable.

The Event in Contemporary Cosmology

What is incredible about Whitehead’s 1929 Gifford lectures on Cosmology is that, for the most part, what seemed perhaps difficult to handle in 1929 has, rather than becoming outdated, been backed up by contemporary cosmologists. That the event is something that appears on the microcosmic level, is an idea shared by

cosmologists as much as philosophers. The work of controversial theoretical physicist Lee Smolin, who has been in the public eye recently because of his critique of string theory, bears enormous resemblances to Whitehead and Smolin's work can almost be seen as a Gaia theory on a cosmological level, seeing the whole universe as a self-organising system.¹

Smolin claims that, '[t]he universe consists of a large number of *events*. An event may be thought of as the smallest part of a process, a smallest unit of change. But do not think of an event as a change happening to an otherwise static object. It is a change, no more than that' (TRQ 53). Compare this to Whitehead's statement that 'the continuity of nature is the continuity of events' (CN 76). Smolin agrees with Whitehead's ontological principle apart from events or actual occasions, there is nothing. 'Space is nothing apart from the things that exist; it is only an aspect of the relationships that hold between things. Space, then, is something like a sentence. It is absurd to talk of a sentence with no words in it. Each sentence has a grammatical structure that is defined by relationships that hold between the words in it, relationships like subject-object or adjective-noun. If we take out all the words we are not left with an empty space, we are left with nothing... If you change a sentence by taking some words out, or changing their order, its grammatical structure changes. Similarly, the geometry of space changes when the things in the universe change their relationships to one another' (TRQ 52). Smolin goes on to say that Einstein's relativity theory and quantum physics no less tell us than scream at us that our world is a history of processes. 'All the skill of the artist cannot turn a process into a thing, for

¹ Smolin's work takes us towards a view of 'cosmological natural selection' which also bears many similarities to Whitehead's ideas of cosmic epochs. I have analysed the connections between these two theories in my last conference paper given at the University of the West of England.

there are no things, only processes that appear to change slowly on our human timescales' (*ibid*).

Once again, in Smolin's theory, the cosmos is made up of small units of process. The structures are so ephemeral that they only last for around 10^{-44} second before morphing into a new configuration. Space-time is defined as a network of abstract links that connects these processes rather like nodes linked on an airline route map. Electrons and quarks – and consequently atoms and people – are the consequence of these processes wrapping around and tangling up with each other. Castelvechi, a commentator on Smolin's work, noted that this makes the universe and ourselves rather like stubborn dreadlocks.

Smolin tells us that we must think of our universe as a history of processes: 'Elementary particles are not static objects just sitting there, but processes carrying little bits of information between events at which they interact, giving rise to new processes. They are much more like the elementary operations in a computer than the traditional picture of an eternal atom... If we keep in mind that what we see is the result of photons impinging on our eyes, it is possible to imagine our view of the world in a quite different way. Look around and imagine that you see each object as a consequence of photons having just travelled from it to you. Each object that you see is the result of a process by which information travelled to you in the shape of a collection of photons. The farther away the object is, the longer it took for the photons to travel to you. So when you look around you do not see space – instead, you are looking back through the history of the universe. What you are seeing is a slice through the history of the world. Everything you see is a bit of information brought to

you by a process which is a small part of that history. The whole history of the world is then nothing but the story of a huge number of these processes, whose relationships are continually evolving... We must see [the world] as something created, and under continual recreation by a number of processes acting together. The world we see around us is the collective result of these processes.’ (TRQ 64)

What Smolin argues is that the picture we now have of our universe is radically different to the common sense or classical picture of the universe. The physics taught to children at school is often so far out of date and rather cold compared to the way things are at the quantum level. Smolin urges that a new picture of the universe must be taught; one where process, self-organisation and connection are the key players. Joni Mitchell sings ‘We are stardust. We are golden. And we’ve got to get ourselves Back to the garden’ and what would have probably been written off as ‘Woodstock’ hippy nonsense must now become an essential world-view. Reminding ourselves that everything we are made of, with the exception of hydrogen, was fused in the stars brings us closer to the image of the ‘symphony of life’ as presented by Deleuze. Not only are we ‘stardust’ but every one of our molecules has previously been in other bodies and will part of other bodies in the future: ‘We belong to the universe, we are at home in it, and this experience of belonging can make our lives extremely meaningful.’ (Capra 60)

Again, Smolin’s work brings us towards a Univocity of progressive differentiations very similar to Deleuze and Whitehead, like their common ancestor

before them, Gottfried Leibniz², they all pursue a pluralistic cosmology in which there is one universe: one universe of many subjective centres of experience.

Conclusion

I have focused on the ontological thinking of Badiou on the one hand and Deleuze and Whitehead on the other. To note their similarities as well as the key differences. One of the key reasons why there has been such continued interest in the work of Deleuze and especially in Whitehead is that their philosophies continue to give the guide-ropes for the examination of our contemporary questions. In regards to contemporary science, political theory and philosophy their philosophies continue to be fresh and provide us with an appealing ontological outlook. I hope to have shown that as the scientific views of theorists such as Lovelock, Smolin and Harding expand and overlap, the more they resemble a cosmology rather like the one presented in Whitehead's Gifford Lectures.

It has been my argument throughout this paper that Badiou fails to provide such an appealing ontology. While Whitehead and Deleuze continue to point forward, there is a sense in Badiou's work that his radical 'detachment' is in fact rather than less radical than he would like. He in fact leads us towards a view of ontology which is politically and ecologically unsustainable. It seems that what is appealing in Badiou, the event as a moment of dramatic self-realisation after which nothing remains that was is in Deleuze and Whitehead's work; however, it is part of a rather

² The 'Secret School' of Leibniz, is the subject of my PhD research. There is a line-of-flight in Cosmology which leads all the way from Leibniz through the British Idealists, to Whitehead, to Deleuze and the Process philosophers and ends up with the contemporary Cosmologists and scientists such as Lee Smolin, Julian Barbour, David Finklestein and John Wheeler who are also heavily influenced by Leibniz.

more appealing philosophy of organism. Badiou states the problems that Deleuze had with his conception of the event in his *The Clamour of Being*. 'How I would so like him to point out to me once again, as he did with such great relish in so many different passages, to what extent my philosophy has a reflexive, negative or analogical value – by which he meant an anti-value, a constellation of the most dire faults' (76). I hope to have shown *why* there are such dire faults with Badiou's conception, it extracts us from the life of the world-soul and leaves us stranded in mathematics. In a letter to Remond in 1714 Leibniz wrote that he found himself most surprised when he realised that he could not find the ultimate reasons for the laws of motion in mathematics and instead had to turn to metaphysics. However, it was this insight that lead him to monads as the ultimate constituents of reality, process as the only *true* substance and, therefore, it was this insight that makes him the modern philosopher of the event opening a window into the folds of life.

A Leibnizian 'ecology' is what links Whitehead and Deleuze to Lovelock and Smolin and it is what makes all of their works so contemporary. We must think of ourselves as feedback loops with the wider ecosphere: One in which our consciousness becomes an extremely important feedback loop. Only when we have improved our perception of the ecological situation can we put our selves in the situation to actually change thing. Self-realisation can only ever happen as part of a wider organic process as we can never separate ourselves from the universe. We can't subtract the event from life and release it to the stars, because we already are the stars.

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