August 26 1911

Dear Beate

Are there any proofs subsequent to Sheet 29 which I have sent you by last night’s post. If you received my earlier than Friday, please (to save time) send a P.C. to press to send me direct another copy. For the Chelsea P.O. must have delivered it already. So... But don’t give general directions, nice on Thursday I go to Cambridge.

I enclose my notes on your message. My general view of your philosophy is that it is in the same state of transition as that in which Kant unfortunately wrote his Critique. What I recognize as distinguishing yours seems to me to be excellent. But where (is ignorance?) I guess that you are rejecting received ideas, I cannot follow. You seem to me

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to lack self-confidence (or rather, time) to
formulate philosophy apart, in accordance
with your own views.
From the point of view of the "message" and
superficial alternations seem to me desirable as
a making apparent of the ragged ends and
difficulties. As a "message," I cannot
judge too highly.

ye affect S. A.

A. H. Y.
Chapter I

Here we start with perception of a table. The question is asked, what properties does the table really have?

As to the "shape" of the table - Why assume that our perception of space is two-dimensional? Perhaps you don't. I can't get a definite answer just now. But the general impression on my mind is that you do - Jury such an assumption is false psychology.

Real table (if it exist) = a Physical Object [p.6]

Senses immediately tell us, not the truth about the object in it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data which, as far as we can see, depend on relations between us and the object. [p.10? also of p.15?6]
Here is paper 5, 6 and 10 you seem by a slight of hand to take away the table which I (the plain man) perceive. I see a "yellow table" as I feel a hard table, and I infer that I feel what I see. You (rather obscure) tell me that I feel the yellowness and feel hardness and infer a real table. Such inferences are quite beyond plain people like myself. I perceive objects, and want to know the name about the reality of the objects I perceive. You ignore this object (or rather, struggle it away) and proceed to talk about properties, variations of yellowness and hardness, etc. of the inferred object which causes them. This criticism naturally extends to later chapters also.
Chapter II

Your construction of the world in Chapter IV seems to me to be entirely fallacious.

Firstly, the reality of space seems assumed, e.g.

"... it cannot ever have been in a place where I did not see it." There is no such place.

Secondly, my talk of the cat being hungry, thereby suggesting that the cat really exists while I look at it.

As far as I can see all your objections are arrived at by making facts presuppositions inconsistent with the position.

My suggestion that the strongest ground to take is to appeal to our judgment as to the worth of our affective and vision of our moral intuitions. These judgments must be true, if the teleologist is right.

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Chapter III

p. 23 "The real space is public, the apparent space is private & the recipient."

p. 24 "These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call "physical" space."

p. 24 "Thus it is quite gratuitous to suppose that physical objects have colours and therefore there is no justification for making such a supposition. Exactly similar arguments apply to other sense data."

p. 36 "Our previous arguments concerning the colour did not prove it to be mental; they only proved that its existence depends upon the relation of our sense organs to the physical object - in our case the table."

But the table has been smugled away. If you look up - you have only left us.
Reactions of colour etc. as an imaginary physical world which causes it. Note that the particular causes of our reactions suffer from the usual defect of all particular causation. If you trace it down far enough, all our reactions (on the scientific hypothesis) come from the relation of ourselves to the whole universe. Was not Berkeley talking of the table which the plain man perceives?

Surely you are wrong in making Kant identify the "physical object" with the "thing-in-itself." All the notions associated with time, space, number, causation apply to your "physical object" none of them.
to Kant, I say — in itself.

I venture to summarize Kant thus —

I (ego) am in relation to a reality other than myself. This relation, as known to me, is to be found in my sensations, these alone are marks of an activity other than my own. I, by a self-activity which can be analyzed into an application of the pure forms of time and space and a synthetic unity of apprehension [time my theories (Fr. 247)] and weld these relations of time and space (expressed in sensation) into perceptions of objects, the phenomenal objects. All our ordinary ideas apply to these phenomenal objects necessarily, because they are merely expressive...
of an analysis of the process of formation of my molecules of science are concerned phenomenal objects which have never the other properties of being in time and place, but have a permanent permanence of existence and of mutual relation to the perceived phenomenal objects. Thus is thus satisfying the intellectual demand that all change is a change of something itself permanent. [He lays down this principle somewhere but I have not read him for more than 20 years, so cannot quote]. As to the others, nothing of the real other than myself which is indicated by my sensations. I infer its existence from the lack of necessity in the
occurrence of sensations, so that sensation do not express myself —

Now if this is anything like Kant, you do not touch him — 1st, you misunderstand the physical object (= scientific molecule) as in 'public space' with less thing — is itself — 2nd, you have smuggled away and ignored the phenomenal object with which he starts. Thus the whole point of the 'phenomenon' he maintained (you on p. 18 is lost — 3rd you 'main objection' on p. 19 is that our nature is a part of the 'existing world'. What do you mean by 'existing world'? Apparently something is true for tomorrow applies to it. To Kant would certainly have
denied this. This would be the phenomenal ego. The transcendental ego is not in time; rather converse, according to your argument, what Kant has to face is that he has not proved that the phenomenal objects are the same as those of tomorrow. This is exactly what he has been trying to prove — namely, that only those things are certain which are necessary to the perception of a phenomenal object. This argument is 'apart from them, no object'. Your argument is 'objects may tomorrow have different properties'. Your reply is 'Then there will not be any objects to have any properties'.
(p. 27)

Finding your second objection that 2 + 2 physical objects must make 4 physical objects does not apply. Of course I admit that he gives himself away by talking of things in themselves, thus admitting the idea of plurality to apply. But a discovery must be admitted to be allowed some lapses. 'Reality is itself' so your argument collapses. For if you say 'real itself is one' he answers 'real itself is many' or 'real itself is five' he answers 'none of these numerical ideas apply.'
Simplifying all your remarks about the beech tree fall.

Finally you say, "At least Reality is itself something." He replies, "Yes, but now I am conceiving Reality...itself as a phenomenal object, the counterpart of my phenomenal self."

It seems to me that Chapter V is not within a hundred miles of Kant's position.
Chapter IX

you have entirely failed to convince me that there is such an universal as "whatchers." Your own only argument is that a lot of bother will be created in reconstructing the existing philosophical terminology of explanation. To a plain man this is very unconvincing— all philosophy is un-American to us.

I admit your proof as it relates to...

As to your proof that universals are not mental [Your paper are not numbered here], I wish you had taken a simple instance that Edinburgh is north of London. I am in such doubt as to the status of...
Edinburgh, 'ad North,' ad London
in the physical world, as of the
status of the physical world as left
by you, that your argument doesn't
carry much weight.

To repeat, you define the physical objects
as 'real' in p. 6 of my notes. It all
your subsequent arguments seem to me
to be that, if we now assume some
physical objects, e.g., cats, to be
real, the result is very paradoxical.
Of course it is.

But of course, if you sweep away Kant's past
or Babbage, of course you are left with
unrelated physical worlds.
interrelated part of one thing.

In the first alternative there are relations not in the mind. What I am objecting to is that one cannot see what you are assuming in the London-Edinburgh illustration.